Oil, gas, jihadism and militarization in the Taoudeni Basin, Mali

The ‘second front war on terror' in the Sahara is building alongside a growing number of multinationals hoping to extract oil and gas reserves of Mali and Mauritania, and strong French military presence.


Description

In the 1970s, geologists became aware that the Taoudeni basin possesses considerable quantities of gas and liquid petroleum resembling the petroleum-rich provinces in Algeria, Niger, Sudan, and Libya, yet during the following three decades, it remained a ‘last extraction frontier,’ largely unexplored. During one of his numerous visits to the region, the former leader of Libya, Mouammar Kadhafi pronounced this premonition for the Mali’s Sahel-Sahara region, including the Taoudeni Bassin: “The North of Mali is very rich in mineral resources. If you don’t take care, one day the West will come and install themselves permanently in order to exploit your resources.” (Maïga 2015).       The Taoudeni Basin is now being divided and explored. This process has entailed a new phase of exploration from multiple international companies, a reframing of national policies, and increasing insecurity resulting in the militarization of the region. Beginning in 2004 the Government of Mali (GOM) under president Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) began hastening down the pathway towards becoming a member of Africa’s petroleum club, by adopting a new law related to petroleum (LAW No 04-037 / of August 2004), which established the organization of, exploration for, exploitation of, and refining of hydrocarbons. Along with this, nearly 700,000 km2 of land divided into 29 blocks across five sedimentary basins have been marked out across the basin, and these were offered as shared concessions between the national government and foreign petroleum companies.

See more...
Basic Data
NameOil, gas, jihadism and militarization in the Taoudeni Basin, Mali
CountryMali
ProvinceRegion of Taoudeni, Mali
SiteTaoudenit
Accuracy of LocationMEDIUM regional level
Source of Conflict
Type of Conflict (1st level)Fossil Fuels and Climate Justice/Energy
Type of Conflict (2nd level)Oil and gas exploration and extraction
Specific CommoditiesWater
Crude oil
Land
Natural Gas
Project Details and Actors
Project DetailsThe Taoudeni Basin, spanning from the southern edge of Algeria through northwestern Mali and across Mauritania is one of the main structural units of the West African Craton and the largest sedimentary basin in Africa with an area of approximately two million square kilometers and 5,000 meters thick. Originally, the name stems from the town Taoudenit, a site where salt excavation and trade has persisted since 16th Century. Along with salt, the basin possesses gold, phosphate, natural gas, petroleum, and water, held within what used to be an ancient sea of fresh water. Climate in Taoudeni is extremely harsh, with temperatures climbing to 40 or 48 degrees Celsius during the hottest time of the year.

Even with the country barely prepared to elect a new president after the coup d’etat in 2012, leaders in Mali affirmed the importance of pulling in investment as an important step in securing peace and stability in northern Mali and the broader region (Oumar 2013). And, bringing in this investment requires a certain level of security. Ould Habib, political analyst from Mauritania stated, “[p]erhaps the Malien government understood that by bringing in the international coalition against terrorism, that there was an opportunity to bring in investment to the zone, and once the security is established and the military maintains the peace, supported by the West, who have installed themselves in the area.” (ibid.) The “opportunity of the war against terrorism” is thus to push forward a route towards development, build the economy around extractives, and, presumably reduce the chaos currently dominating the country (Kabada Ould Abdelrahman, quoted in Oumar 2013).

Since this petroleum push at the turn of the Century, multiple international companies have purchased, sold, and repurchased holdings in the Taoudeni basin. While shifting regional security has produced changes in the makeup of holdings over time, there are over 15 companies currently or in the past who have held exploration contracts, and only one with an exploitation contract. In Mali, foreign investors include: Baraka Energy and Resources Limited (Australia), Sonatrach (Algeria), New Catalyst (USA), Heritage Oil (Canada), Circle Oil PLC (Ireland), Raven Resource Group (UEA), Selier Energy (Canada), Sphere Investments Ltd. (Canada), Markmore Group (Malaysia), Simba Energy (Canada), Statoil (Norway), African Oil Corporation (Canada). In Mauritania, foreign investors are: Total (France), Repsol (Spain), Qatar Petroleum (Qatar). All of these companies have current or had past holdings in the basin. While exploration has not yet translated to extraction, there have been several wells drilled on seismic testing in the blocks that have been sold.

The Mali Peace Accords were signed in January of 2015. Moreover, since the signing of the Peace Accords, administrative units have been established in the newly established Taoudeni region. More recently with the visits of Economy Minister and later President Emmanuel Macron to Mali, the European Union invested 50 million euros (55.8 million dollars) in the war against terror. and Macron called upon the United Nations to further fund the efforts to maintain peace and security in this oil-rich region. There are also German troops in the region. In May 19, 2017, Macron's second visit broad as new President abroad was to Mali, in a high level mission. While it appears that the France-Mali securitization strategy will be extended, operation BARKHANE has had little to show for its 3-years of counter-terrorism efforts in the region (Chelbi 2017). As stated by Yvan Guichaoua, “States that accept this foreign presence win credibility externally, but are weakened internally. It creates a quasi-protectorat” (Carayol 2016).

Summaries by company:

Baraka Energy and Resources Limited (Australia): In October 2004, five large exploration permits (Blocks 1, 2, 3, 4, and 9) totaling 193,200 square km (one-third the size of Texas) in northern Mali and two permits (Blocks Ta11 and Ta12, approved in 2007 by the Mauritanian government) covering approximately 60,000 square kilometers were awarded to Baraka (the company changed its name to Baraka Energy and Resources Limited in 2011), a Perth-based company (OGJ 2004). The total area Baraka holds within the total basin is approximately 272,000 km2, a total of 8 blocks. The area extends from the Algerian border in the east across to the Mauritanian border to the west. Baraka has undertaken to spend $51 million across all five permits and $4.9 million in the two Mauritanian permits. They hoped to begin exploitation in 2011 to 2014, and sold 50% of their rights to Eni and 25% to Sonatrach in 2006 (Reuters 2013). However, in 2013, just before the French military intervention in Mali, Eni gave up their exploration rights.

Sonatrach (Algeria): In 2009, Sonatrach completed promising seismic tests in the basin, and Algeria’s national oil company promised to invest more than $11.5 million in the Taoudeni basin between 2013 and 2017. However, insecurity in the region due to multiple activities including those of Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) caused them to cease operations in January 2013. The company resold Block 4 in the Basin to the Government of Mali due to continuing insecurity, and at the end of August 2013, Czech company New Catalyst committed to invest 51.7 million euros (57.7 million dollars) to begin prospecting in the Taoudeni Basin, Block 4. In October 2014, Sonatrach declared that it would return operations to Mali after the signing of the peace accords (in 2015) for the civil war brewing in northern Mali. They have yet to return.

Heritage Oil (Canada): Beginning June 2005, Heritage oil has been awarded Blocks 7 and 11 in Mali’s Taoudeni Basin in partnership with Mali Oil Developments SARL, a subsidiary of Centric Energy. The two licenses cover an area of approximately 72,000 square kilometers in the Gao Graben. Heritage has the right to earn 75% working interest in each of the blocks. A two-year extension has been awarded in January 2009 so that the group may continue with seismic acquisition and reporting to determine drilling areas (centricenergy.com).

Circle Oil PLC (Ireland): Also in August 2013, Circle Oil PLC promised nearly 7.7 million euros (8.6 million dollars) to explore in the remaining areas of the Taoudeni, Blocks 21 and 28.

Raven Resource Group (UAE): On August 19, 2013, Raven Resource Group obtained an exploration license in the basin for Block 6, in Mali through its subsidiary Corvus Resources Management Limited. It will invest $50 million over a period of seven years. (prnewswire.com).

Other holdings: 1) Selier Energy, a Canadian company is interested in Block 18, with an area of 19,259 square kilometers in the Taoudeni Basin and has pledges $11.2 million for explorations. Sphere Investments Ltd., an Australian company is operating in Blocks 8 and 10. Markmore Group, a Malasian company has in the past applied for Blocks 5 and 6. Other players that have bought and sold holdings in Taoudeni include: Canadian oil and gas company Simba Energy (Block 3); Africa oil corporation, and Norweigan company Statoil.
Project Area (in hectares)70,000,000
Level of Investment (in USD)73,700,000
Type of PopulationRural
Potential Affected Population70,000 - 140,000
Start Date01/01/2006
Company Names or State EnterprisesNational Company for Petroleum Research and Exploration (AUREP) from Mali
Baraka Petroleum Limited from Australia
Sonatrach from Algeria
Selier Energy from Canada
Sphere Investments Ltd. from Australia
Markmore Group from Malaysia
Centric Energy from United Kingdom
Heritage Oil from Canada
Circle Oil PLC from Ireland
Raven Resource Group
Total SA from France
Qatar Petroleum from Qatar
Relevant government actorsGovernment of Mali; Minister of Mining, Energy, and Water; Government of France; United Nations
International and Financial InstitutionsUnited Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MUNISMA)
Environmental justice organisations and other supportersMouvement National de Liberation de l'Azawad (MNLA) http://mnlamov.net/
The Conflict and the Mobilization
Intensity of Conflict (at highest level)HIGH (widespread, mass mobilization, violence, arrests, etc...)
When did the mobilization beginPREVENTIVE resistance (precautionary phase)
Groups MobilizingIndigenous groups or traditional communities
Local government/political parties
Pastoralists
Women
Ethnically/racially discriminated groups
Tuareg (Mouvement Nationale pour la Liberation de l’Azawad)
Forms of MobilizationBlockades
Boycotts of official procedures/non-participation in official processes
Development of a network/collective action
Development of alternative proposals
Land occupation
Media based activism/alternative media
Street protest/marches
Threats to use arms
Occupation of buildings/public spaces
Impacts
Environmental ImpactsPotential: Biodiversity loss (wildlife, agro-diversity), Global warming, Soil contamination, Waste overflow, Oil spills, Surface water pollution / Decreasing water (physico-chemical, biological) quality, Groundwater pollution or depletion, Loss of landscape/aesthetic degradation, Noise pollution
Health ImpactsPotential: Accidents, Occupational disease and accidents, Mental problems including stress, depression and suicide, Violence related health impacts (homicides, rape, etc..) , Deaths
Socio-economic ImpactsVisible: Violations of human rights, Militarization and increased police presence, Other socio-economic impacts, Lack of work security, labour absenteeism, firings, unemployment, Specific impacts on women, Loss of landscape/sense of place
Potential: Increase in Corruption/Co-optation of different actors, Displacement, Increase in violence and crime, Loss of livelihood, Land dispossession, Loss of traditional knowledge/practices/cultures, Social problems (alcoholism, prostitution, etc..)
Outcome
Project StatusProposed (exploration phase)
Pathways for conflict outcome / responseCorruption
Criminalization of activists
Repression
Deaths
Violent targeting of activists
Migration/displacement
Project temporarily suspended
Institutional changes
Land demarcation
Withdrawal of company/investment
Development of AlternativesThe CMA is interested in seeing investment and funding from the oil production in their zone. Moreover, they wish to have control of how contracts are agreed upon, with much more local input. They do not see an alternative to extracting this oil, at present.
Do you consider this as a success?No
Why? Explain briefly.The CMA (Tuareg-led coalition) did not achieve autonomy over their territory and the resources it contains continues, especially due to the mounting threats from multiple jihadist groups upon the stability of the region. There is a continuation of militarization in the zone, which happens together with new investment in Taoudeni.
Sources and Materials
Legislations

Mali's Petroleum Code
[click to view]

CMA's Conditions for the signing of the peace accords
[click to view]

References

D. Meunier 1980. Le commerce du sel de Taoudeni. Journal des africanistes, Vol 50(2) pp. 133-144.
[click to view]

Brownfield et al. 2016. Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Taoudeni Basin Province, Mali and Mauritania, 2015. USGS
[click to view]

Keenan 2008. US Militarization in Africa: What Anthropologist should know about AFRICOM. ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY, Vol 24 No 5, October 2008
[click to view]

Besteman, C. 2008. Beware of those bearing gifts: An anthropologist's view of AFRICOM. Anthropology Today, Vol 24(5).
[click to view]

EXPLORERS PREPARE TO EVALUATE TAOUDENI BASIN IN MALI, MAURITANIA
[click to view]

(Arfaoui 2016) Une analyse géopolitique du conflit malien
[click to view]

Links

(Khayar 2013) Lettre ouverte des travailleurs GS4 à Taoudéni
[click to view]

(Le Post 2011) Le Sahel, nouvel Eldorado de l’or noir ?
[click to view]

(Figaro 12/05/2017) Total signe un contrat en Mauritanie
[click to view]

(Wane, CableGate) CableGate ou les murmures de l’Oncle SAM : Les raisons de la « Guerre de Sarkozy » en Libye doivent servir de leçons aux maliens
[click to view]

(Reuters 2013) Mali: Eni pulls out of Mali on poor prospecting outlook
[click to view]

Vanderbruck, T. 2013. The untold Story of Mali and Oil. (perspective promoting the return of former colonial powers to protect weak states from terrorism)
[click to view]

(Oil Review Africa 2017) Total expands exploration activities in Mauritania with new deep offshore license
[click to view]

(Ag Moumoud 2015) "La France nous avait donné son feu vert pour l'indépendance de l'Azawad" / Hama Ag Mahmoud
[click to view]

Macé 2017) Paix au Mali : l'espoir fragile
[click to view]

(Chelbi 2017) L'échec de l'intervention française au Mali
[click to view]

(Turse 2017) The War You've Never Heard of
[click to view]

(Carayol 2016) Yvan Guichaoua : « Avec Barkhane, on fabrique des quasi-protectorats » au Sahel
[click to view]

(Déchainé 2014) La France explore t- elle le bassin pétrolier de Taoudéni ?
[click to view]

(PRNewswire.com 2013) Raven Resources Group Acquires Exploration License in Prospective Taoudeni Basin
[click to view]

(OGJ 2004) Mali: Private company awarded huge exploration permit
[click to view]

(21/2/14 RFI) Au Mali, les mineurs de Taoudeni chassés par des hommes armés
[click to view]

(Bainafouna 2012) Les raisons françaises de la déstabilisation du Mali
[click to view]

(Malinet 2017) Mali : LE PETROLE MALIEN, MYTHE OU REALITE : Selon des estimations, le Mali pourrait extraire environ 900 millions de barils sur une période de 25 ans à partir du bassin de Taoudéni
[click to view]

(Studer 2015) Mali : la stratégie du chaos pour la main-mise de l’uranium, du gaz et du pétrole ?
[click to view]

French Defense Minister Sylvie Goulard, Army Chief of Staff, General Pierre de Villiers, Foreign Minister Jean-Yves le Drian and President Emmanuel Macron visit the troops of Operation Barkhane, France's largest overseas military operation, in Gao, Mali, May 19, 2017.
[click to view]

(Oumar J. 2013) Des accords énergétiques au Mali pourraient renforcer la région du Sahel
[click to view]

(Studer 2013) Mali : le pétrolier algérien Sonatrach suspend l’exploration du bassin de Taoudeni
[click to view]

(Studer 2013) Mali : l’armée française pour repousser les groupes islamistes … et défendre les intérêts de Total ?
[click to view]

Macron Returns to Mali for Security Summit

(Studer 2017) La France demande à l’ONU une force anti-terrorriste G5 Sahel … sous forte odeur de pétrole
[click to view]

Sonatrach attend un accord de paix pour reprendre l’exploration pétrolière dans le nord Mali
[click to view]

(Maïga 2015) Uranium – pétrole – eau minérale : Les ressources minières du nord pillées ?
[click to view]

Other Documents

Salt Block of Taoudenit The original commercial enterprise of Taoudenit was the mining and transport of salt. Cut into large blocks, one camel could carry up to 6 blocks to the boats of the Niger river in Tombouctou, where they would continue to the Guinea Coast.
[click to view]

Manifestation de sympathisants Protest of those sympathizing with the MNLA's cause and who are against all military occupation in the Azawad.
[click to view]

The US supports France's efforts in Mali "We couldn't let you dig alone!"
[click to view]

Manifestation de sympathisants Protest of those who are sympathetic to the MNLA's cause and against all militarized occupations in the territory of Azawad.
[click to view]

Map of the Taoudeni Basin Includes the basin's blocks between Mauritania and Mali
[click to view]

Kidal Wall graffiti Calls for France's Barkhane military campaign to leave northern Mali
[click to view]

The blocks of Mali's Taoudeni Basin All blocks of basin
[click to view]

Meta Information
ContributorJulie L. Snorek, Environmental Justice Atlas, [email protected]
Last update02/07/2017
Comments