Rasi Salai Dam, Thailand

Description

Rasi Salai Dam, located in the Northeast region of Thailand on the Mun River, is part of the Khong-Chi-Mun Project (KCM) scheme, a large-scale irrigation scheme planned for Northeast Thailand (also known as the Isaan region) by the Thai government. The project was commissioned in 1989, construction began in 1992, and was completed in 1994 as a 17-meter high concrete dam with a large reservoir. Original plans were for the dam to provide irrigation to approximately 5,500 hectares; however, the second estimate suggested that only 1,600 ha of land would be irrigated. Unfortunately, the canals were never completed thus rendering the dam useless. The dam was originally estimated to cost US$4.32 million (140 million Baht), but actual costs were far over budget costing US$26.7 million (871 million Baht – nearly six times the planned amount).

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Basic Data
NameRasi Salai Dam, Thailand
CountryThailand
ProvinceSi Sa Ket Province
SiteRasi Salai District
Accuracy of LocationHIGH local level
Source of Conflict
Type of Conflict (1st level)Water Management
Type of Conflict (2nd level)Dams and water distribution conflicts
Land acquisition conflicts
Plantation conflicts (incl. Pulp
Aquaculture and fisheries
Specific CommoditiesLand
Water
Project Details and Actors
Project DetailsIrrigation capacity of 1,600 ha (but was not realized)
Project Area (in hectares)10,000
Level of Investment (in USD)USD$ 26,300,000
Type of PopulationRural
Potential Affected Population15,000-17,000
Start Date01/07/1997
Relevant government actorsMinistry of Environment, Technology and Science , RID (Royal Irrigation Department), DEDP (Department of Energy Development and Promotion)
Environmental justice organisations and other supportersInternational Rivers, AoP (Assembly of the Poor), TFCG (Tam Forest Conservation Group)
The Conflict and the Mobilization
Intensity of Conflict (at highest level)HIGH (widespread, mass mobilization, violence, arrests, etc...)
When did the mobilization beginMobilization for reparations once impacts have been felt
Groups MobilizingFarmers
Fishermen
Local ejos
Neighbours/citizens/communities
Social movements
Local scientists/professionals
Forms of MobilizationBlockades
Creation of alternative reports/knowledge
Development of a network/collective action
Development of alternative proposals
Involvement of national and international NGOs
Land occupation
Official complaint letters and petitions
Public campaigns
Sabotage
Street protest/marches
Occupation of buildings/public spaces
Impacts
Environmental ImpactsVisible: Surface water pollution / Decreasing water (physico-chemical, biological) quality, Groundwater pollution or depletion, Biodiversity loss (wildlife, agro-diversity), Floods (river, coastal, mudflow), Food insecurity (crop damage), Loss of landscape/aesthetic degradation, Soil contamination, Soil erosion, Deforestation and loss of vegetation cover
Potential: Desertification/Drought, Large-scale disturbance of hydro and geological systems, Reduced ecological / hydrological connectivity
Health ImpactsPotential: Malnutrition, Deaths
Socio-economic ImpactsVisible: Displacement, Lack of work security, labour absenteeism, firings, unemployment, Loss of livelihood, Loss of traditional knowledge/practices/cultures, Violations of human rights, Land dispossession, Loss of landscape/sense of place
Potential: Militarization and increased police presence
Outcome
Project StatusIn operation
Pathways for conflict outcome / responseMigration/displacement
Do you consider this as a success?No
Why? Explain briefly.The dam is seen as an overall failure for many reasons. The required EIA for the project was not completed and the reservoir sits on top of a large underground salt dome, which results in water too salty for irrigation use. The salination of the reservoir meant the dam’s irrigation canals were never built and the second proposal that 1,600 ha would be irrigated was also not successfully completed. People have seen major losses in livelihoods, which have yet to be recognized officially. Prior to construction, no information of the projects design or impending impacts were released to the public (3) (12) (13) (14).
Sources and Materials
Legislations

National Environment Quality Act (Thailand, 1992); Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550, article 57, article 58, article 66, article 67, article 85, article 87 (Thailand, 2007); Official Information Act (Thailand, 1997); Ratification of Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, UNFCCC; Khong-Chi-Mun Project (KCM, Thailand); Ninth National Plan (Thailand, from 2002 to 2009); Power Development Plan (Thailand);

References

(3) Dulin, Allison; Franko, Cloe; Heun, Christi; Masterson, Spencer. (2008). “Voices from the Margin: Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Northeast Thailand, Rasi Salai Dam”. ESCR Mobilization Report.

(4) Molle, Francois. 2005. Irrigation and water policies in the Mekong region: current discourses and practices. International Water Management Institute (IWMI).

(5) South-East Asia Rivers Network (SEARIN Thailand), The Committee to Save Tam Mun (The Committee to Save the Fresh Water Swamp Forest in the Mun River), Assembly of the Poor, Wildlife Fund Thailand (20 April 1999) “Report on social impacts”

(6) Sneddon, Chris. 2002. Water Conflicts and River Basins: The Contradictions of Comanagement and Scale in Northeast Thailand. Society & Natural Resources 15.725-41.

(7) Sneddon, C. 2003. Reconfiguring scale and power: the Khong-Chi-Mun project in northeast Thailand. Environment and Planning A 35.2229-50.

(8) Sretthachau, Chainarong; Nungern, Kittima and Olsson, Anna. (2000). “Social Impacts of the Rasi Salai Dam, Thailand: Loss of Livelihood Security and Social Conflict”. Southeast Asia Rivers Network (SEARIN). Submission for The World Commission on Dams Public Hearing, 26-27 February 2000.

(9) The World Commission on Dams Public Hearing (2000) “Social Impacts of the Rasi Salai Dam, Thailand: Loss of Livelihood Security and Social Conflict”, February 26-27; 2000, Large Dams and their Alternatives in East and Southeast Asia: Experiences and Lessons Learned Southeast Asia Rivers Network (SEARIN)

(1) Coddington, Claire et al. (n.d.). “Rasi Salai Dam”. A Collaborative Community Consultation Report”.

(2) Committee of the Mun River Wetlands Conservation Network (CMRCN-Rasi) Peace and Human Rights Center of Northeast Thailand Peace and Human Rights Center of Northeast Thailand (2008) “Voices from the Margin - Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Northeast Thailand - Rasi Salai Dam”, ESCR Mobilization Project

Links

(11) ELECTRICITY GENERATING AUTHORITY of THAILAND, “Data on Rasi Salai Dam”,
[click to view]

(12) Dulin, Allison; Franko, Cloe; Heun, Christi; Masterson, Spencer. (2008). “Voices from the margin”. International Rivers. 8 December 2008.
[click to view]

(13) Living Rivers Siam Association. (n.d.). “Rasi Salai Dam”.
[click to view]

(14) Living Rivers Siam Association. (1999). “Basic information about Rasi Salai dam”. Thai Baan Research, Publications, 20 April 1999.
[click to view]

(10) Blake, David J.H. (2013). “Thai Dam-Affected Villagers Demand Fair Compensation”. International Rivers. From World Rivers Review, June 2013.
[click to view]

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ContributorCarl Middleton, Sarah Allen, Matilde Sgotto
Last update24/06/2014
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