At the end of the civil war in the DRC and the peace deal of 2003, the country revived its plans to construct Inga 3. In 2004, the Western Power Corridor (Westcor), a consortium of national utilities from five southern and central African countries (Angola, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo), organized and signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the DRC government to build the plant, with its power to be distributed to all signatory countries through the Southern African Power Pool. However, in 2009 DRC withdrew from the consortium and the remaining partners decided to open up the tender to private companies. The international mining corporation BHP Billiton won the tender, with its proposal to develop Inga 3 as well as a 2,000MW rated aluminum smelter in the vicinity of the hydropower plant. BHP Billiton also finally  withdrew from the deal in 2012, and this is when the World Bank and other financial institutions came on board (May 2013). South Africa sealed a power-purchase agreement with Congo in 2013 and committed to buy 2,500MW of the 4,800MW to be generated, making South Africa the key purchaser of the Inga 3 electricity.  The treaty binds SA to a huge financial liability to help the dam to be built. Assuming 90% availability, SA’s uptake with normal maintenance and no droughts would be worth about $500m-$600m a year. [2] The development of Inga would be implemented as a public-private partnership (PPP) deal. The African Development Bank, World Bank, French Development Agency, European Investment Bank and Development Bank of South Africa have all shown interest in financing Inga 3. In December 2013 the United States, through its development agency USAID, also expressed interest in contributing to the financing of Inga 3. As of now, the pick is between a consortium headed by China Three Gorges Corporation, Sino Hydro, and Snel, the state-owned power utility; or a consortium comprising ACS and Eurofinsa of Spain [2]. Chinese firms are also suggesting the construction of an aluminum smelter near Inga III to process bauxite imported from Guinea. The winner is to be announced in October 2016, and director of works hopes construction can begin in November 2016, even without due environmental impact assessment studies [4]. Interest in providing technical and political support also came from Egypt, both countries aiming at connecting the North Africa and South African grids [5]. According to International Rivers, "The development of this hydropower project raises a number of concerns. Firstly, the power production from the Inga 3 is mainly for industry users and will not improve the access level for the more than 90% of the DRC population who have no access to electricity. Most of Inga 3’s power will travel long distances to the industrial and urban centers in South Africa and large mines in DRC, bypassing Congolese who are not served by the nation’s limited grid. The Democratic Republic of Congo's (DRC) has suffered decades of civil war, during which corruption has become entrenched in the socioeconomic fabric of the nation. By many accounts, the country has acquired a reputation as a failed state. It is sad to note that, in this vein, the Inga 3 stands to become a large-scale infrastructure of false ideals. People will have to be relocated and agricultural land in the Bundi Valley will be lost. The development model for the project does not appear to make any considerations to meet the expectations of the locals. On the contrary, the project will only add national debt burden, with very strong prospects of promoting corruption and allowing powerful companies to cheaply exploit and export Africa's vast natural resources. Large volumes of research carried out worldwide have shown that grid-based electrification is not cost-effective for much of rural Sub-Saharan Africa where the population density is low."[1].  In 2014, the World Bank approved a $73 million grant to finance preparation of Inga 3, including the environmental, social and technical studies. Two years on, these studies have not even begun because of irregularities in the procurement process. In May 2016, the Project Director of Inga 3 proposed that construction of the dam could commence next year even without these studies. However, on July 25, the World Bank finally suspended its support for the giant Inga 3 Dam in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Joshua Klemm, Policy Director of International Rivers, comments: “The World Bank’s withdrawal illustrates that Inga 3 violates basic environmental and procurement standards. Any other investors should think twice about getting involved in this white elephant.”

From Congo, Rudo Sanyanga, Africa director of the International Rivers, reported last May 2016 that "civil society and the government have wildly different views of Inga 3 and Grand Inga. [...] many suggest that it is the only vehicle that will spur meaningful development in the country and encourage economic interest in the continent as a whole. [...] The government is also fiercely proud of the fact that the DRC has the largest potential for hydropower in Africa — estimated at over 100,000MW including the mighty Congo River and small microhydro sites in smaller watersheds around the country. The Inga site alone has a potential of 50,000MW,"[2]

UPDATE:

Decades after the construction of the first

dams within the complex (Inga I + II) the governments promises have yet materialized:

For the villages of Kilengo, Lundu, Lubwaku & Mvuzi within a 20km radius of

the project, electricity access and job promises have proven elusive [6]. Even

worse, none of the villages have running water. An economic analysis conducted

in 2017 states that the Inga III extension rather plunges DRC deeper into debt,

while worsening the living conditions of the local community around the proposed

region [7]. Nevertheless, the DRC government, together with South Africa, presses

ahead with Inga III dam in the midst of the covid19. In a conference on the

Grand Inga Dam Project held in June 2020, South Africa is restating its

commitment to purchase 5000MW of electricity generated from the project [8].

However, SA government still lacks a feasibility study and Caroline Ntaopane,

South Africa’s National Campaign Coordinator, concludes: “It is in the interest

of the SA government to put its citizens first by focusing attention on economic

recovery rather than on costly projects that have no benefit to the economy,

and energy-poor communities and women and which will further push the country

into debt” [8]. Despite, Inga III would generate 11,050 MW which primarily are

meant for South Africa, other African markets and Congo’s copper and cobalt

miners [9].

Early this year a new agreement over the

construction of the project states that its developers comprise six Chinese companies,

including China Three Gorges Corp and AEE Power Holdings from Spain [9]. The

Spanish building firm ACS withdrew. Furthermore, Congo’s president announced a

consortium of African Heads of State to promote Grand Inga, and thus to encourage

calls for national interests to purchase energy [10]. African private organizations

and UN agencies were invited as well in order to accelerate the continental

efforts towards the worldwide largest hydroelectricity project. 

Inga III would be a new dam located less than a mile from the first two. It would have a relatively simple run-of-the river design; such dams don’t store water like traditional dams. Instead, in Inga’s case, the dam would divert water from the river to a neighboring valley, through turbines, and then back into the river.