In spring 2011, the former Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi presided over the cornerstone laying ceremony of what would become the largest hydroelectric power plant of Africa, at (declared) 6,000 MW of capacity. In that occasion, Zenawi stated that the dam would bring benefits to the Ethiopian population and to downstream Sudan and Egypt. During last years many controversies have emerged, and now the dam is at the center of a huge dispute and a water conflict of geopolitical importance among countries sharing the Nile river basin. The general feeling is that the GERD has been more a pawn on a geopolitical chessboard rather than a tool for poverty reduction, so far. The design of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), also called Millennium Dam or Hidase Dam, was developed under a veil of secrecy [1] and without providing public information on the development plan. In a flawed bidding process, the Italian company Salini Impregilo SpA was granted the construction works, the same contractor for the five ‘sisters’ Gibe dams (I to V) on the Ethiopian Omo river. The project was promoted with the aim to increase access to clean energy to the Ethiopian population, boost the Ethiopian economy without compromising downstream countries of Sudan and Egypt. However, the NGO International Rivers started a campaign to bring out the truth [2]. First, they argue that it is a myth to say that GERD will assure energetic resilience to the country.  Ethiopia already relies entirely on hydropower, and in face of an increasingly volatile climate, it would be better to diversify the sources of energy rather than to invest in large dams once again. If we add the fact that the dam is estimated to be 300% oversized [3] its desirability makes even less sense. The main objective seems rather to make water a commodity, as the dam is expected to allow Ethiopia to export 200, 500 and 200 MW of electric power to Sudan, Kenya and Djibouti, respectively. Second, it is highly unlikely that Ethiopian citizens will benefit economically from GERD, as it is financed almost entirely by coercion through governmental bonds deducted annually from their salaries. With its cost of $4.8 billion over fifty-year period, the investment risks to bring Ethiopia in increased national debt. As of 2016, 85% of Ethiopians live in rural areas and of these, only 2% have access to the electric grid. Of the remaining urban dwellers, only 86% are able to enjoy this option. The project appears therefore even less consistent with its objectives. Third, GERD is a source of potential and actual serious negative impacts on society and the ecology of the region. This huge dam will flood approximately 1,680 square kilometers of forest, displacing approximately 20,000 people living out of flood-recession farming, gold-panning, and fishing. Even if supporters of the project claim that such people are going to be provided with land elsewhere and job offers related to the project itself, such practice is likely to affect negatively the lives and livelihoods of the displaced both in the short and long term, as it was done top-down and without previous consent. The government did not consult the affected communities, and journalists have been sentenced to jail for reporting violence in resettlement practices. Environmentally, the dam will likely contribute to irregular episodes of flooding, drought, and mudslides; the reduced water supply in the dry season is going to facilitate seawater intrusion to the river system, threatening agriculture, fisheries, and ecology in the delta; temperature rises might reduce the productivity of major crops; deforestation will contribute to climate change worsening. Moreover, the extremely high temperatures and low precipitation of the region will lead to high evaporation losses rates. Finally, increased sedimentation may easily lead to landslides and slope failures. If GERD seems not to provide substantial economic, social, or environmental benefits to the Ethiopian population, why its government has so strongly supported its realization? According to more than one source [4], the dam has been used strategically by Ethiopia to consolidate its power position in the region, appealing to foreign sources of external finance and the instability brought by the Arab Spring and the resignation of the President Mubarak in Egypt. As the decision of building the dam was taken unilaterally by Ethiopia only, the structure challenged the existing colonial-era 1959 Agreement applying on the region which regulated the shared basin, establishing the impossibility to build dams upstream and maintaining sort of leadership of Egypt over the basin governance. Egyptian economy relies heavily on the waters of the Nile, so the threats of water scarcity and fastened salinization due to the potential impact on the operations of the Egyptian Aswan High Dam and the 10-year filling time of GERD turned the polemic on. Egypt’s original stance was one of strong opposition to the realization of the dam. A curious episode provides a sense of the magnitude of the conflict level in mid-2013. Without knowing that their discussion was being broadcast live on a state-owned television channel, Egyptian politicians were planning to sabotage the dam, by means of military, intelligence, or backing rebels [5]. Later on, Cairo changed strategy, but not position. In February 2014, Egypt began a diplomatic offensive through a campaign aimed at gathering international support about their concerns [6]. In the meanwhile, the third stakeholder involved, Sudan, is supporting the project. This decision is attributable to the share of energy produced by the dam, while the stabilization of the river’s flow would increase the agricultural output [7]. Just when President Sisi took office in June 2014 Cairo changes the political line about GERD. The discussion shifted from whether or not the dam should be built to how the problem consequent to its realization and management was addressed [8]. According to Lossow and Roll (2015), this is thanks to lobbying practices by politically influential corporations like Qalaa Holdings and cable manufacturer Elsewedy Electric, which have made significant investments in Ethiopia. However, the three involved countries set the basis for cooperation, and during 2015 some instruments paved the way for a new legal arrangement [9]. The agreement on principles for the management of the facility was signed and new studies on the dam impact were assigned to international consultants. But as complications emerged in the assignment of the task, while Ethiopia did not stop construction works and plans to fill the dam soon, Egyptian politicians fear that the agreement is just a formality [10]. It's worth adding that as in the case of the other controversial Ethiopian Gibe III dam, the World Bank indirectly supports the project by financing the $684 million worth, 1,000-kilometer-long transmission line from Ethiopia to Kenya [11]