Although effective exploitation of groundwater resources represents the most cost-effective and sustainable solution to Lebanon’s water problems [1], the Lebanese government has gone on a recent “dam obsession,” [2] ignoring the associated environmental risks, cheaper alternatives, and core issue behind water shortages, namely severe mismanagement of an otherwise abundant resource. [1] The Qaysamani dam in Falougha is yet another dam under construction in Lebanon, located on the Mghiteh plateau, which was proposed in the ten-year national water strategy of the Ministry of Energy and Water in 2010. The residents of Hammana, a Christian village, have been fiercely opposing the project since its inception, claiming that it threatens their central water source, the Chaghour spring, besides being harmful to the environment and failing to meet its stated objective of providing the specified volume of water (including good quality potable water), with its current design and specified location. The country’s complicated sectarian dynamic, however, has infiltrated this issue as well, with other surrounding villages with largely Druze constituencies supporting the project, suspecting that citizens of Hammana want to rob them of the promised water resource. Meanwhile, citizens of Hammana claim that the political leaders backing the project have ties to the contracted company and will benefit financially from the Kuwaiti loan, although there is no evidence to back this claim. Scientific facts, however, highlight the irrational nature of the project. The location is a highly seismic area, one of the most active in Lebanon, and a study by professors at the American University of Beirut shows that if the wall collapses Hammana will be flooded within two hours [4]. Ironically, campaign members state that the response of former minister of energy Gebran Basil to this concern was that only one house in Hammana will be flooded at worst, not being able to refute the claim that the dam might collapse. Moreover, the porous geology of the land and its Karstic nature make it unsuitable for a dam, which will lead to a high amount of leakage. According to Marie-Helene Nassif, a local of Hammana and a water expert, taking into account the costs and benefits of the project, particularly the huge loan that will have to repaid, the project becomes unreasonable. Dr. Naji Kodeih also argues that the EIA conducted did not explore alternative proposals, such as collecting water downstream from the Chaghour river, which would result in more water storage than building the dam. He claims that it seems the broader goal is not to make rational use of the country’s water resources, but rather building the dam seems to be an end in itself. [5] As for the EIA, it was conducted for a project at a different location, in Qaysamani (hence the current name of the dam) but no EIA was conducted when the location was changed. Meanwhile, government officials kept blaming Hammana residents for slowing down this project with their actions and complaints. |
The “dam obsession” of the Lebanese government ignores the associated environmental risks, cheaper alternatives, and core issue behind water shortages, namely severe mismanagement of an otherwise abundant resource
| Name of conflict: | Qaysamani Dam, Lebanon |
| Country: | Lebanon |
| State or province: | Mount Lebanon Govenorate |
| Location of conflict: | Hammana |
| Accuracy of location | MEDIUM (Regional level) |
| Project details | The dam is projected to store 1 million cubic meters of rain and snow water and will supply 35 villages in Mount Lebanon with potable water. The names of these specific villages, however, are not provided in any official report. It is located on the Mghiteh Plateau which is within the protected zone of the Chaghour Spring. As such the law forbids any construction in the area, to avoid damaging the natural course of the spring, thus rendering the project illegal. Moreover, alternative studies show that realistically the dam can only store 650 thousand cubic meters of water, which means that it will provide each of these villages with only one tank of water a day. |
| Project area: | 12,000 |
| Level of Investment for the conflictive project | 34,000,000 |
| Type of population | Semi-urban |
| Affected Population: | 8,000 |
| Start of the conflict: | 2012 |
| End of the conflict: | 06/07/2016 |
| Company names or state enterprises: | Societe Mouawad-Edde S.A.R.L. from Lebanon - Project contractor Liban Consult from Lebanon |
| Relevant government actors: | Council for Development and Reconstruction Ministry of Energy and Water Ministry of Environment Establishment of the Water of Beirut and Mount Lebanon |
| International and Finance Institutions | Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) from Kuwait |
| Environmental justice organizations (and other supporters) and their websites, if available: | NoDam Campaign Lebanon Eco Movement (as support not as organizers) |
| Intensity | LOW (some local organising) |
| Reaction stage | PREVENTIVE resistance (precautionary phase) |
| Groups mobilizing: | Local ejos Neighbours/citizens/communities Social movements Local scientists/professionals |
| Forms of mobilization: | Blockades Creation of alternative reports/knowledge Development of a network/collective action Development of alternative proposals Lawsuits, court cases, judicial activism Media based activism/alternative media Objections to the EIA Official complaint letters and petitions Public campaigns Street protest/marches |
| Environmental Impacts | Visible: Loss of landscape/aesthetic degradation, Groundwater pollution or depletion, Deforestation and loss of vegetation cover Potential: Floods (river, coastal, mudflow), Surface water pollution / Decreasing water (physico-chemical, biological) quality, Large-scale disturbance of hydro and geological systems, Biodiversity loss (wildlife, agro-diversity), Reduced ecological / hydrological connectivity, Desertification/Drought |
| Health Impacts | Potential: Exposure to unknown or uncertain complex risks (radiation, etc…) |
| Socio-economical Impacts | Visible: Increase in Corruption/Co-optation of different actors Potential: Displacement, Loss of livelihood |
| Project Status | Under construction |
| Conflict outcome / response: | Corruption Court decision (undecided) Moratoria Project temporarily suspended |
| Proposal and development of alternatives: | A group of engineers from the Hammana region have proposed capturing water downstream from the Chaghour spring and distributing it to the villages. The proposed project would provide a volume of water 5 times higher than the one to be stored in the Qaysamani dam. |
| Do you consider this an environmental justice success? Was environmental justice served?: | Not Sure |
| Briefly explain: | Although campaigners were not successful in stopping the project, they felt they had many "breakthroughs" in terms of learning how the system functions and its loopholes, which can all be used for future campaigning against other dam projects, especially since they understood the dynamics of the water sector in Lebanon. They also felt like they were successful in terms of organizing a campaign, where a civil society group was active on the long term with an actual strategy, something not very common in Lebanon. Both their successes and failures are examples to learn from. |
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| Related media links to videos, campaigns, social network |
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| Contributor: | Catherine Moughalian, Asfari Institute, AUB |
| Last update | 18/08/2019 |
| Conflict ID: | 2699 |