Rasi Salai Dam, Thailand

Description:

Rasi Salai Dam, located in the Northeast region of Thailand on the Mun River, is part of the Khong-Chi-Mun Project (KCM) scheme, a large-scale irrigation scheme planned for Northeast Thailand (also known as the Isaan region) by the Thai government. The project was commissioned in 1989, construction began in 1992, and was completed in 1994 as a 17-meter high concrete dam with a large reservoir. Original plans were for the dam to provide irrigation to approximately 5,500 hectares; however, the second estimate suggested that only 1,600 ha of land would be irrigated. Unfortunately, the canals were never completed thus rendering the dam useless. The dam was originally estimated to cost US$4.32 million (140 million Baht), but actual costs were far over budget costing US$26.7 million (871 million Baht – nearly six times the planned amount).

Basic Data

Name of conflict:	Rasi Salai Dam, Thailand
Country:	Thailand
State or province:	Si Sa Ket Province
Location of conflict:	Rasi Salai District
Accuracy of location	HIGH (Local level)

Source of Conflict

Type of conflict. 1st level:	Water Management
Type of conflict. 2nd level:	Plantation conflicts (incl. Pulp Land acquisition conflicts Dams and water distribution conflicts Aquaculture and fisheries
Specific commodities:	Land Water

Project Details and Actors

Project details	Irrigation capacity of 1,600 ha (but was not realized)
Project area:	10,000
Level of Investment for the conflictive project	USD$ 26,300,000
Type of population	Rural
Affected Population:	15,000-17,000
Start of the conflict:	01/07/1997
Relevant government actors:	Ministry of Environment, Technology and Science , RID (Royal Irrigation Department), DEDP (Department of Energy Development and Promotion)
Environmental justice organizations (and other supporters) and their websites, if available:	International Rivers, AoP (Assembly of the Poor), TFCG (Tam Forest Conservation Group)

Conflict & Mobilization

Intensity	HIGH (widespread, mass mobilization, violence, arrests, etc...)
Reaction stage	Mobilization for reparations once impacts have been felt
Groups mobilizing:	Farmers Local ejos Neighbours/citizens/communities Social movements Local scientists/professionals Fisher people
Forms of mobilization:	Blockades Creation of alternative reports/knowledge Development of a network/collective action Development of alternative proposals Involvement of national and international NGOs Land occupation Official complaint letters and petitions Public campaigns Sabotage Street protest/marches Occupation of buildings/public spaces

Impacts

Environmental Impacts	Visible: Surface water pollution / Decreasing water (physico-chemical, biological) quality, Groundwater pollution or depletion, Biodiversity loss (wildlife, agro-diversity), Floods (river, coastal, mudflow), Food insecurity (crop damage), Loss of landscape/aesthetic degradation, Soil contamination, Soil erosion, Deforestation and loss of vegetation cover Potential: Desertification/Drought, Large-scale disturbance of hydro and geological systems, Reduced ecological / hydrological connectivity
Health Impacts	Potential: Malnutrition, Deaths
Socio-economical Impacts	Visible: Displacement, Lack of work security, labour absenteeism, firings, unemployment, Loss of livelihood, Loss of traditional knowledge/practices/cultures, Violations of human rights, Land dispossession, Loss of landscape/sense of place Potential: Militarization and increased police presence

Outcome

Project Status	In operation
Conflict outcome / response:	Migration/displacement
Do you consider this an environmental justice success? Was environmental justice served?:	No
Briefly explain:	The dam is seen as an overall failure for many reasons. The required EIA for the project was not completed and the reservoir sits on top of a large underground salt dome, which results in water too salty for irrigation use. The salination of the reservoir meant the dam’s irrigation canals were never built and the second proposal that 1,600 ha would be irrigated was also not successfully completed. People have seen major losses in livelihoods, which have yet to be recognized officially. Prior to construction, no information of the projects design or impending impacts were released to the public (3) (12) (13) (14).

Sources & Materials

Juridical relevant texts related to the conflict (laws, legislations, EIAs, etc)

National Environment Quality Act (Thailand, 1992); Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550, article 57, article 58, article 66, article 67, article 85, article 87 (Thailand, 2007); Official Information Act (Thailand, 1997); Ratification of Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, UNFCCC; Khong-Chi-Mun Project (KCM, Thailand); Ninth National Plan (Thailand, from 2002 to 2009); Power Development Plan (Thailand);

References to published books, academic articles, movies or published documentaries

(4) Molle, Francois. 2005. Irrigation and water policies in the Mekong region: current discourses and practices. International Water Management Institute (IWMI).

(6) Sneddon, Chris. 2002. Water Conflicts and River Basins: The Contradictions of Comanagement and Scale in Northeast Thailand. Society & Natural Resources 15.725-41.

(3) Dulin, Allison; Franko, Cloe; Heun, Christi; Masterson, Spencer. (2008). “Voices from the Margin: Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Northeast Thailand, Rasi Salai Dam”. ESCR Mobilization Report.

(5) South-East Asia Rivers Network (SEARIN Thailand), The Committee to Save Tam Mun (The Committee to Save the Fresh Water Swamp Forest in the Mun River), Assembly of the Poor, Wildlife Fund Thailand (20 April 1999) “Report on social impacts”

(7) Sneddon, C. 2003. Reconfiguring scale and power: the Khong-Chi-Mun project in northeast Thailand. Environment and Planning A 35.2229-50.

(8) Sretthachau, Chainarong; Nungern, Kittima and Olsson, Anna. (2000). “Social Impacts of the Rasi Salai Dam, Thailand: Loss of Livelihood Security and Social Conflict”. Southeast Asia Rivers Network (SEARIN). Submission for The World Commission on Dams Public Hearing, 26-27 February 2000.

(1) Coddington, Claire et al. (n.d.). “Rasi Salai Dam”. A Collaborative Community Consultation Report”.

(2) Committee of the Mun River Wetlands Conservation Network (CMRCN-Rasi) Peace and Human Rights Center of Northeast Thailand Peace and Human Rights Center of Northeast Thailand (2008) “Voices from the Margin - Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Northeast Thailand - Rasi Salai Dam”, ESCR Mobilization Project

(9) The World Commission on Dams Public Hearing (2000) “Social Impacts of the Rasi Salai Dam, Thailand: Loss of Livelihood Security and Social Conflict”, February 26-27; 2000, Large Dams and their Alternatives in East and Southeast Asia: Experiences and Lessons Learned Southeast Asia Rivers Network (SEARIN)

(12) Dulin, Allison; Franko, Cloe; Heun, Christi; Masterson, Spencer. (2008). “Voices from the margin”. International Rivers. 8 December 2008.
[click to view]

(11) ELECTRICITY GENERATING AUTHORITY of THAILAND, “Data on Rasi Salai Dam”,
[click to view]

(13) Living Rivers Siam Association. (n.d.). “Rasi Salai Dam”.
[click to view]

(10) Blake, David J.H. (2013). “Thai Dam-Affected Villagers Demand Fair Compensation”. International Rivers. From World Rivers Review, June 2013.
[click to view]

(14) Living Rivers Siam Association. (1999). “Basic information about Rasi Salai dam”. Thai Baan Research, Publications, 20 April 1999.
[click to view]

Meta information

Contributor:	Carl Middleton, Sarah Allen, Matilde Sgotto
Last update	18/08/2019
Conflict ID:	185